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Hobbes literally brackets or excludes the problem of 'Externall violence' or more generally international politics as beyond the reach of his new political science. From this perspective Hobbes would perhaps be amused by the fact that he is considered a seminal theorist of international relations.
Such an historical approach to Hobbes' scholarship may well explain his apparent silence regarding international relations, but in doing so it raises a series of profound questions. Is it possible to demarcate international and domestic politics in the way Hobbes seems to suggest? Does Hobbes' "new science" nevertheless have an implicit teaching on international relations? What implications does such a teaching have for Hobbes' claims that his discoveries promise an "everlasting" Commonwealth? In this chapter I argue that Hobbes' reticence regarding international relations is not a minor omission; his relative neglect of international politics undermines significantly his new political science. 6 By concentrating on the 'sovereign', who sits at the intersection of the domestic and international, I suggest that
Hobbes' solution to political instability in the state-the institution of the glorious sovereign-exposes the state to greater international instability and therefore ultimately undermines the Hobbesian promise of an everlasting commonwealth. By his own measure, the Hobbesian sovereign will be a glory-seeker, and as such, will pose in the international community (and consequently for the Hobbesian state) the same problems and dangers that
Hobbes discerned in the glory-seeker in the state of nature. Thus the problem of the glorious sovereign is not only a problem for international relations, it poses a major challenge to
Hobbesian political thought by revealing the ambiguous place of judgment, prudence and statesmanship in Hobbes' science, radically questioning its scientific, mathematical and geometrical presuppositions. In the first part of the chapter I outline Hobbes' views on international relations, derived by implication and analogy from his writings on the constitution of the state. I then 3 examine Hobbes' understanding of the passions, and show how his diagnosis of the state of nature and his proposed solution of awesome fear institutionalizes a proud, glory-lover as sovereign. In the final part I explore the extent to which such a glorious sovereign undermines Hobbes' aspirations for a peaceful and commodious commonwealth.
Hobbes and the Law of Nations
In the Leviathan, near the end of chapter XXX, "Of the OFFICE of the Sovereign
Representative," Hobbes explains why he does not discuss international politics extensively.
The passage deserves quoting at length:
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. This deceptively simple account suggests that international politics is identical to Hobbes'
well-known depiction of the laws of nature that apply where there is no "Civil Government," that is, in the state of nature. 9 For Hobbes the Law of Nature, which is not in fact a law but a "precept, or generall rule," contains the "Fundamentall Law of Nature," which is "to seek Peace, and follow it," and the Right of Nature, which is, "By all means we can, to defend our 4 selves." 10 Where there is no common power to keep all in awe, the nature of man yields "three principall causes of quarrell"-Competition, Diffidence and Glory-which issue in a condition of "warre, as is of every man, against every man." 11 In such a state, "every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body." 12 Hobbes is aware, of course, that there are limits to such an analogical approach. As he notes, the posture of war between sovereigns, requiring constant vigilance and spying, does not lead to the incommodities of war for individuals because sovereigns, in providing a common power within each state, uphold the "Industry of their Subjects." Thus international politics as a state of nature allows for, or is consistent with, the possibility of industry, cultivation of the earth, navigation, commodious buildings and the general advancement in arts and letters. This 'maximalist' Hobbesian internationalism has as its starting point an appreciation of the greater efficacy of the laws of nature in international relations. 16 The analogy between the individual's place in the state of nature, and the sovereign's in international relations does not hold in certain important respects. Though sovereigns must assure their own safety and the security of the state, and therefore wars waged for this purpose are just because there is no other recourse, 17 sovereign states are more secure than individuals in the state of nature (for example, they are not all equal; they need not sleep; they are not mortal). Moreover, because sovereigns uphold the "Industry of their Subjects," alleviating their misery, those passions that incline individuals in the state of nature to peace are less forceful in international relations. 18 But the absence of a common power in the international realm also means a greater freedom in international relations, so that the laws of nature need not be silent. As
Johnson puts it, "peace will not be as urgent a priority as it is in relations among individuals, but the need to violate the laws of nature will also not be as urgent." 19 Hobbes' claim, as we noted above, is that the Law of Nations is identical to Law of Both minimalist and maximalist interpretations of Hobbesian international relations reveal the crucial role of the sovereign, in pursuing peace to the extent that it does not jeopardise security, while encouraging domestic tranquillity and therefore prosperity. Hobbes' 'new science,' it seems, depends fundamentally on the prudence and judgment of political leaders. 26 But Hobbes seems ambiguous on this point. On the one hand he is not concerned with individuals as such but institutions, so that once his institutional arrangements are in place, anyone can be the sovereign. 27 The Sovereign is the "Artificiall Soul," of that "Artificiall Man," "that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE."
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As he states in his dedication to Francis Godolphin, "I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman
Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there)." 29 Where you are, it seems, is more important than who you are for Hobbes. 30 This view is supported by his debunking of the Aristotelian understanding that some should command because they are more prudent and wise. Hobbes' response is that "For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others." Consequently it is possible to judge the reasonableness of a sovereign's actions, even if we cannot question or challenge it's justice. 36 Thus the protreptic ambitions of the Leviathan and
Hobbes' other works, seeking to educate sovereigns (and subjects) in what constitutes reasonable action. 37 We can see this educative aspect especially in the extensive discussion of the sovereign's rights and duties in the second part, "Of Commonwealth," of the 40 Yet it is precisely the proud that Hobbes states will be sovereign. 41 Hobbes' solution to the problem of war in the state of nature is the union of all those who consent to equality-who repudiate pride. Such a union requires the proud or the glory-seeker as sovereign who will superintend and keep overawed all parties to the contract. Even if this 9 solution to the problem of pride results in domestic stability, will it not exacerbate it internationally, given the challenge and opportunity international relations presents to the glory seeker? What will stop Hobbes' hope of a peaceful and industrious commonwealth from soon being transformed by ambitious sovereigns into Machiavellian armed camps, where martial virtù discharges the discordant humours in the republic. To evaluate the merits of this argument, it is necessary to understand Hobbes' own assessment of the passions and the way they shape politics.
Diffident, Competitive, Glorious
Hobbes is famous for denying the ancients' premise that human beings are "Politicall creatures" or lovers of some "greatest Good." 42 "general diffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another," he also argues that some men are vainglorious and seek "superiority," while others look only to equality.
Yet each type confronts this scarcity and struggle in its unique way. That is, while all people seek power, they have different judgments about how much power they need and about what confers the necessary power. 51 This latter person-one of "those men who are moderate"-wants more power only because he "cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more." 52 This lack of assurance is a form of "hopelessness" that makes the Diffident desperate, forcing them into enmity. The Diffident who is "reasonable," according to Hobbes, will secure himself by "Anticipation"; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.
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The disposition of the Diffident-a low estimation of one's success in life, due to either constitution or experience-determines how he will wage war (reasonably; by anticipation) and when he will stop ("till he see no other power great enough to endanger him"). 54 As
Hobbes notes, Diffidence as a "cause of quarrell" makes a man invade for "Safety" and use
Violence to "defend" his body and possessions. Thus it seems that hopelessness of the 11 Diffident yields moderation-the Diffident will not ordinarily seek to conquer or master all other human beings. But he is forced to counter the Competitive. 55 The Competitive does not simply desire, like the Diffident, to secure and defend his possessions. He wants more because he "cannot be content with a moderate power," and so he goes beyond defending his immediate safety and uses violence to make himself "Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell." 56 How can we explain this difference between the two types? Hobbes' general answer is that the Competitive seeks mastery for "Gain." The reason for this, it would seem, is that unlike the Diffident, the Competitive are hopeful that they have the power necessary to overcome other people. 57 They may hold this hope because their bodies are constituted differently, or because of their previous, generally successful experience, or a combination of both.
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The limited character of the desire of the Competitive to conquer reveals the fundamental difference between the Competitive and the Glorious. According to Hobbes, glorying is a type of "Joy," which is a pleasure of the mind.
In any case, the Competitive, unlike the Diffident, go on the offensive not as a matter of pre-emptive defense but in order to gain power over others. In doing so, however, they never think that "Mastery" is anything other than a means to gain; they tend not to derive pleasure in exercising their power over other human beings except in the sense that it indicates, or is a measure, of gain. Consequently, their need to master is always constrained and circumscribed by material gain, and they can tolerate others who do not threaten that gain. 59 More specifically, it is an "exultation of the mind" arising from "imagination of a mans own power and ability." 60 While all people alike seek power, some people look for their power exclusively in glory, which explains why Hobbes states that the "Ends" of some is "conservation" and for others "delectation," or "intense delight." 61 Beyond the "short vehemence" of "carnall Pleasure"
open to all people, intense delight can be found "in contemplating" one's "own power in the 12 acts of conquest," which produces great pleasure at the confirmation to oneself of one's power. 62 Some glory-seeking is to be expected of all people because even the most "moderate" person naturally demands some value be placed on their person and finds joy in "comparing himselfe with other men" and judging himself "eminent." 63 One piece of evidence for this view, Hobbes suggests, is the fact that everyone laughs, which is a rush of "Sudden Glory."
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But Hobbes also notes that glory-seekers often pursue glory "farther than their security requires," creating the problem that some seek glory even at the risk of their lives.
Moreover, there is clearly a link between glory and the security we naturally want, since conquering others can make you secure.
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For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power, to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by example.
For these people, glory becomes disengaged from its source in the pursuit of the power needed to preserve their vital motion. But why would anyone put the security of his person and property at risk for the sake of glory? Certainly, the characteristically human and intense nature of the pleasure of actual conquest must contribute to this forgetting or overreaching.
Yet this is not the only reason. In Hobbes' account of the person who invades for "Reputation," we come to appreciate some of the major difficulties that inhere in the nature of acquiring and maintaining glory: 66 The first difficulty concerns the demands of Glory. When we recall that, according to
Hobbes, we tend to value ourselves higher than our neighbours, then we realise the inherent and unavoidable obstacle in satisfying the Glory lover. 67 Our inherent inability to judge or 13 "value" accurately (that is, equally) is the foundational human problem that exacerbates our dealings with each other. Hobbes argues that it is a law of Nature "That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature." 68 Yet all people do not always do this and the glorious never do so, and it is this "Pride" that requires creation of the Leviathan-the "King of the Proud." 69 In addition to this core difficulty, there is the problem of construing "signs" of valuing. Unable to see internal motions, we attempt to read external signs, so that "trifles,"
such as "a word, a smile, a different opinion" become signs of undervalue. 70 These subtle indicators come to replace the gross signs of security-mastery of people and things-that comforts the Diffident and the Competitive. Yet the trivial and subtle nature of these signs shows how easy it is for us to misconstrue them, especially given our initial suspicions that we are being undervalued. Finally, the problem of Glory is that it enlarges the Glorious. The
Glory lover can be personally slighted by 'reflexion'-by undervaluing "their Kindred, their
Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name."
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These problems in establishing true valuation pale in comparison with what is required to restore the joy or pleasure of glory upon being slighted. The glory lover needs to "extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by example." In short, the glory lover must prove his worth by publicly injuring the contemnors so that the victim will concede superiority and others will see in the injury proof of the glory lover's Thus, Glory expands the "self" of a person from his "body" to include a range of other things not usually linked to him. This, of course, is part of the intense pleasure of Glory, the feeling of being bigger, greater, or more majestic. Indeed, the Glorious falls in love with his reputation because "extraordinary power"
continually satisfies the never-ending desire for power. Yet such passionate attachment to glory and its feeling of enlargement exposes the glorious to greater risk of undervaluing and therefore anxiety, demanding greater vigilance and attention in satisfying the need for glory.
14 power. Note the core dilemma for the glory lover: he is compelled to risk himself to show his power. Sustaining the joy that is glory may necessitate harming his body or undermining his power as property. In the extreme case, the glorious may risk his own life to show his power.
Therefore, the pleasure of glory is not checked by the moderating demands of security and property in two senses. The first is in the sense that we have noted-the glorious will illogically sacrifice his life for his name. The second is that the pleasure of glory seeks to ever-increase its delectation-glory will in social terms seek ever greater mastery, at the risk of security. Empire rather than "realistic accommodation" is the end point of glory.
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Glory and International Relations
The discussion above indicates that it is the glory-seeker who will be Hobbes' sovereign.
According to Hobbes, war, the amoral, logical consequence of human "Endeavour," is premised on the tendency of the Glorious type to challenge and test each other regarding their worth, thereby compelling both the Diffident and the Competitive to enter into warfare far beyond what they would ordinarily wage. 73 If the Glorious could exist without strugglingthat is, with an assurance of their power-then the Diffident (and perhaps the Competitive to a great degree) could lead a life as peaceful and productive as those of bees or ants. 74 Hence
Hobbes' institutional arrangement where challenges to the sole glorious are no longer possible or feasible, and where the Diffident and Competitive can prosper in his shadow. 75 But such sovereignty will only fuel the pride of the glorious. As sovereign his own sense of worth (and therefore pleasure in contemplating it) will now be confirmed by success and magnified by the grandeur of office. The greater and more powerful the commonwealth the more glorious the sovereign. With such greatness comes the increased likelihood of being contemned. Unchecked by common powers, sovereigns in their international relations will easily misconstrue such slights to pride as challenges to security. 76 Sovereigns, seeking 15 greater pleasure in asserting their glory, and attempting to repudiate the challenges to their reputation, will seek to defend themselves and their nations through proof of their superiority-through the use of increased sovereign power in international relations. To do so, however, they will need to put into place all those elements for successful campaigns, ranging from recruiting of spies to reveal secrets or mislead the enemy, to the construction of forts and defences, to finally the raising of armies and navies to wage war. The more successful such ventures, the more the sovereign will be tempted not to disband such machinery, but to retain their services in more ambitious undertakings, ostensibly to secure itself, in fact to enhance the glory of the nation. Before too long, the sovereign's glory will point to a policy of imperial ambitions, stimulated and sustained by its success.
Hobbes of course knew of these dangers. As he notes, "yet in all times, Kings, and
Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators." 77 In admitting that there is no real difference between commonwealth by institution and commonwealth by conquest he indicates the ubiquity of international war as the foundation of sovereignty. ) may be a problem for all sovereigns. Hobbes may also argue that given the identity of public and private interests in a monarchy, the welfare of the people and the dangers and costs of war will provide a natural check on this glorying: 83 Sensible sovereigns do not take "any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory." 84 Clearly continuous warfare that impoverishes its people and ruins a state will make it much more likely to be dissolved or conquered by neighbours. Thus there is a powerful reason for sovereigns to restrain themselves for the sake of preserving their glory. 85 But it is the nature of glory-seekers to risk all for all. Though aware of such arguments which suggest a sort of natural justice for unreasonable actions, the glorious will excuse themselves as the exception who will succeed, and in failure blame everyone but themselves. The lessons learnt from failure may be either too late or disregarded by the glorious sovereigns. This raises a profound question regarding the extent to which the proud can in a sense be done away with in a Hobbesian world, through institutions and laws. Hobbes would of course deny that all glorying should be dispensed with-a certain form is essential for sovereignty. Yet he does argue that his teachings will result in more reasonable sovereigns. As we have noted, he 17 thinks it is relatively easy to educate the "vulgar" or the "Common people." 86 If true, then the only problem for Hobbes is to convince such an authority to take up his teaching and apply it in the Commonwealth. But this presents a twofold challenge-the need to oust the rich, potent and learned in the pulpits and the Universities who already have the ear of the sovereign, preaching their vain and false philosophy; 87 and to convince the sovereign to adopt
Hobbes' principles. 88 Hobbes states that a sovereign would take up his teaching because it is to his benefit and security. 89 Yet he concedes that he cannot expect this sovereign to be a scientist. It is sufficient that sovereigns and their ministers know the "Science of Naturall
Justice"-they need not understand their origins in "Sciences Mathematical." 90 What emerges from these attempts is a clear confirmation of the limits to the scientific study of politics and therefore Hobbesian education. If the many are like "clean paper," and if the sovereign need not understand the mathematical source of the "Science of Naturall Justice," it seems that even those "diligently, and truly taught" (both the few and the many) will accept
Hobbes' teaching on trust. 91 Indeed, Hobbes' consistent reference to his teaching as a "Novel Doctrine" shows that his attempt to refound politics on a rational basis is really a replacement of Scholastic Doctrine with what appears to be his new scientific piety, with peace as its credo and power as its theology. 92 Therefore, his "Principles of Reason" are another contending dogma, and Leviathan is the new Bible of the Hobbesian world, even containing its own Ten Commandments. 93 As long as the people are educated in Hobbesian terms, accepting the primacy of "power," "rights" and "social contract," then the character of the sovereign becomes irrelevant for political rule. Leaving aside the profound questions this argument raises concerning the place of rhetoric and persuasive speech in Hobbes'
understanding of reasoning as reckoning from definitions, Hobbes may be justified in claiming that his new dogmatics, compared with its predecessors, certainly moderate glorying. 94 Yet in doing so he implicitly accepts that 'who' is sovereign becomes important. 18 Moreover, to the extent that glorying is unavoidable and politically necessary, and in so far as it is characterized by a fundamental immoderation or unreasonableness, it is not clear if
Hobbes' institutional solution to the problem of domestic politics does not reassert, by means of international glorying, the problem of pride in a much more powerful and therefore dangerous way.
Glorious Sovereign and Leadership
Students of international relations influenced by Hobbes have tended to focus on the primacy of fear in shaping international politics. As Hobbes' writings indicate there are sound reasons for taking such an approach. This concentration on fear, however, has been at the expense of neglecting the other passions that, according to Hobbes, lead to political instability and war.
As we have seen, Hobbes had an extensive and sophisticated insight into the significance of honour and glory in shaping both domestic and international politics, a theme that has received insufficient attention in the contemporary international relations scholarship. Thus a return to Hobbes and his subtly crafted writings yields a more subtle appreciation of the range of passions that dominate politics. Such a return also reveals, however, a persistent ambiguity in both Hobbes and contemporary scholarship influenced by him. What is the role and influence of individuals, and therefore political leadership, in determining the character of international relations?
Hobbes claims to be the first true founder of the science of politics or the first political philosopher. He presents his turn to politics as a diversion from his true interests in the "speculation of Bodies Naturall." This diversion, "occassioned by the disorders of the present time," is "without partiality, without application, and without other designe" than "to advance the Civill Power." 95 Hobbes seeks to redefine classical, Christian and even Machiavellian virtue with his new democratic reasonableness. This new virtue, derived from the dignity of 19 keeping one's word, and respecting others, appears indifferent to the necessity of good judgment or prudence, especially from its leaders. Thus both his international and domestic politics is at the mercy of the character of the leader, who in his opinion will have precisely that constitution that will make the Leviathan impossible. 96 Though he appears to be founding the modern liberal state, reliant on rights and commodious living made possible by industry and scientific innovation, what he designs exposes the probability of the armed camp. In this way Hobbes' apparent disregard of international relations reveals the Achilles heel of his teaching altogether-the absence of prudential statesmanship essential for the maintenance of such an institutional solution. Hobbes may counter that he is that person, and that such insight is necessary only once, and has been undertaken by him through his writings. Hobbes, it seems, risks public condemnation as well as the animosity of the few and powerful whom he seeks to displace not out of any personal motive of gain or advantage but for public good. 97 Leviathan, it would seem, is proof of the need and force of nobility or "gallantness of courage" in securing political stability, a gallantness that Hobbes considers rarely found and which is seemingly unaccountable in terms of his account of human "endeavour." 98 Leaving aside the problem of glorying in such a claim, it is not clear that 7 As has often been noted, Hobbes regards his methodological innovation as consisting of applying the principles of mathematics generally, and geometry more specifically, to human beings. According to him, the results of such an undertaking-starting with definitions and then adding or subtracting words until proper conclusions are reached-are irrefutable truths regarding politics, especially concerning the essential rights of sovereigns and the obedience owed by subjects. Hobbes is not modest regarding his achievement. 8 Leviathan, 30, 394.
9 Deceptively simple because in reducing the Law of Nations to Hobbesian Law of Nature he implicitly repudiates stoic notions of ius gentium: see Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J.
